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Into the Cosmos Page 9


  fort through several decades.

  There were compelling institutional explanations for the regime of

  secrecy that surrounded the Soviet space program, rationales that tran-

  scended any need to maintain the fiction of a Soviet lead in the “space

  race.” The fact that the entire institutional structure supporting the So-

  viet space program was lodged firmly and deeply in a military setting

  was undoubtedly the most critical factor. The earliest Soviet successes in

  space—such as the launch of Sputnik, Laika, probes to the moon, Yuri

  Gagarin, Valentina Tereshkova, and many more—were orchestrated by

  the Experimental Design Bureau-1 (Opytno-konstruktorskoe biuro-1, or

  OKB-1) headed by the so-called chief designer Sergei Pavlovich Korolev.

  OKB-1 was subordinated for many years under the Ministry of the De-

  fense Industry and then eventually, like most other space enterprises

  during the late Soviet era, under the Ministry of General Machine Build-

  ing. Both of these ministries were part of the highly secretive military-

  industrial complex, scrutinized by Western intelligence agencies

  throughout the Cold War. OKB-1’s primary goal, at least until the mid-

  1960s was not space but rather to develop more efficient intercontinental

  ballistic missiles for the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. Because of its as-

  sociation with such an overtly military project, Soviet space achievements

  were shrouded in an extra layer of secrecy. In July 1955, when work on

  the rocket that launched Sputnik was reaching peak levels, the Council of Ministers issued a decree “with the goal of ensuring more strict secrecy

  on work carried out on rocket and reactive armaments” that enumerated

  a whole host of new regulations at various enterprises, including the ap-

  pointment of a deputy director at each workplace to oversee secrecy re-

  gimes and bringing in KGB personnel to help.27

  Military secrecy could be justified without much controversy be-

  cause there was “the legitimate strategic purpose of denying sensitive

  national security information to potential enemies.”28 Secrecy over mili-

  tary affairs was particularly stringent in the defense industry, which de-

  veloped weapons. Although the names of certain accomplished design-

  ers—particularly aviation designers—were revealed during the interwar

  years, this practice was abandoned at the height of the Cold War when

  the identities of such designers as Korolev were unknown to the pub-

  lic. Moreover, all information about the organizations that they headed

  56  Asif A. Siddiqi

  was kept strictly secret. Real names of weapons were never used in writ-

  ing. Instead Soviet industrial managers developed an esoteric system of

  naming weapons that relied on a number-letter-number system that was

  based on no discernable logic; in all written documents, for example, the

  Vostok spacecraft was referred to as “object 11F63” ( izdelie 11F63), while its launch rocket was “object 8K72K” ( izdelie 8K72K). Many workers employed at factories contracted to deliver parts for such spacecraft had little

  or no idea what the part was for. Draconian rules dictated daily handling

  of paperwork within defense enterprises, with documents divided into at

  least five categories of access—none of which were permitted to be seen

  by workers not employed by the enterprise. Workers in a particular de-

  partment at an organization usually had no knowledge of what was going

  on in other departments.29

  Military secrecy first emerged as a temporary practice as part of the

  draconian measures adopted during the civil war. These measures were

  reinforced during the so-called war scare of the late 1920s. In 1927 all

  defense factories were renamed so that their traditional names were re-

  placed with numbers beginning from one to fifty-six. Eventually, this

  custom was extended to research and design institutions attached to the

  factories, which were also given numbers to disguise their work profile.

  This tradition endured to the mid-1960s so that Korolev’s organization

  was simply named OKB-1, while a competitor organization was named

  OKB-52. To further obfuscate the mission of these institutions, in the

  1960s ministries introduced a wholesale name change to generic “ma-

  chine building” titles. For example, Korolev’s OKB-1 was renamed the

  Central Design Bureau of Experimental Machine Building, while OKB-

  52 became Central Design Bureau of Machine Building. Afraid that

  Western intelligence would pick up even these bland names, workers at

  such institutions were not allowed to use them in public and instead or-

  dered to use special “post office box numbers” to refer to each institute,

  design bureau, or factory.

  The military secrecy regime far exceeded what was necessary for stra-

  tegic rationales, indicating that this regime was driven by more than sim-

  ply a need to protect state secrets about mobilization plans and weapons

  development. An important driver of military secrecy—and in fact, the

  entire Soviet secrecy regime—was to maintain privilege of those who had

  access to decision making. The historian John Barber and his coauthors

  have noted that “secretiveness was . . . one of the defenses protecting the

  Cosmic Contradictions  57

  priority and privilege of the military sector generally, and of the defence

  industry in particular.”30 Secrecy in the Soviet space program, embedded

  deep within the structure of the Soviet defense industry, stemmed from

  a similar rationale, given that the space program received enormous dis-

  bursements at times—for example, during the era of “stagnation,” when

  many Soviet citizens might have wished for a better standard of living. In

  addition, there were many within the space program who insulated them-

  selves from critique not only from the general public but also from their

  peers within the program who might have threatened their status and

  privilege. Designers would routinely conceal their own plans or exagger-

  ate their own accomplishments to industrial managers or party leaders;

  the system rewarded those who clung to secrecy or obfuscation.

  One of the most enduring examples of military secrecy—the creation

  of a fake launch site—suggests another rationale for military secrecy, one

  that had less to do with protecting military secrets than to project the

  peaceful intent of the space program to the domestic audience. After the

  Sputnik launch Soviet officials said nary a word about exactly from where all these rockets were being launched, but because they wanted to record

  Gagarin’s flight as a world record to the Fédération Aéronautique Interna-

  tionale (FAI), they had to submit the name of the launch site, as per the

  federation’s rules. It was out of question for the Soviets to reveal the name

  and location of the launch range, located in a desolate area of Kazakhstan,

  whose express purpose was to support the launch of intercontinental bal-

  listic missiles (ICBMs). For years, any speculation in the West on where

  Soviet rockets were launched from was immediately reported back to So-

  viet officials, who were extremely sensitive about this information.31
>
  Given this conundrum, two junior officers at a military institute were

  asked to come up with a solution. One of them, Vladimir Iastrebov, later

  recalled that “we needed to name the launch place for the launch vehicle

  of the Vostok spaceship, but we were not allowed to mention Tiura-Tam,

  where the cosmodrome (or more precisely, the rocket range) was located.

  Because of this, [Aleksei] Maksimov and I selected on the map the ‘most

  plausible’ [adjacent] point of launch that was not far from Tiura-Tam. It

  turned out to be the town of Baikonur, and since then, with our casual

  selection, the cosmodrome got its now well-known name.”32 For more

  than two decades after the launch of Gagarin, official Soviet media as-

  siduously maintained the fiction that Soviet rockets were launched from

  a place called “Baikonur” in Kazakhstan, when in fact the town of Bai-

  58  Asif A. Siddiqi

  konur was three hundred kilometers away from the actual launch point.

  The façade was maintained despite the fact that the actual location was

  widely known by Western observers already in the 1960s, suggesting that

  the obfuscation was meant more for a domestic audience rather than a

  foreign one. Soviet citizens were to believe that their glorious space pro-

  gram had purely civilian purposes while the American one had belliger-

  ent intentions.

  Space Censors

  Glavlit, through its daughter organizations and the publishing-house

  system, was the ultimate arbiter in directing the censorship apparatus

  during the Soviet era, but it delegated censorship duties in a number of

  thematic areas, such as military issues, nuclear weapons, and the space

  program, to smaller specialized organs.33 During the early months af-

  ter Sputnik, the process of issuing public communiqués and books on

  the space program was rather haphazard; senior scientists and engineers

  within the program typically drew up statements that passed through

  censors within the Academy of Sciences and the relevant publishing

  house, with Glavlit checking the results but usually deferring to their

  authority.34 The academy posed as a convenient public face of the space

  program although its institutes and staff had little direct involvement in

  Soviet space achievements because it was run almost entirely out of the

  Soviet defense industry.

  Because of this public fiction, many of the thousands of young Soviet

  enthusiasts who wrote to volunteer for the space program addressed their

  letters to “the Academy of Sciences.” These letters were then passed on

  to an institute within the Ministry of Defense with the descriptive name

  NII-4 (pronounced nee-chetyr), which, not so much from intent but rather confusion, inherited much of the public relations functions of the space

  program in the early 1960s. NII-4, whose main job was to evaluate and

  conduct research on the battle-fighting capabilities of nuclear-tipped in-

  tercontinental ballistic missiles, was located in the Bol’shevo suburb of

  Moscow, not far from Korolev’s own design bureau. Here, the institute

  deputy director Iurii Mozzhorin, a colonel in the Soviet artillery forces,

  was handed the job of drawing up the TASS communiqués that were

  hungrily pored over both at home and abroad for clues into the Soviet

  space program. Mozzhorin remembers drawing up the press release for

  Cosmic Contradictions  59

  Gagarin’s launch in advance of the event. Three preprepared envelopes

  were distributed to radio and TV stations and TASS, each containing the

  text of a particular scenario (complete success, death of cosmonaut at

  launch or in orbit, or emergency landing of cosmonaut on foreign terri-

  tory); depending on the outcome, the press was ordered to open one and

  destroy the others.35

  Throughout the 1960s each State Commission—the ad hoc group

  of high-level individuals from different branches of the government that

  oversaw a particular space mission—had a special “press group” that au-

  thored and disseminated information about space events. By mid-decade,

  however, it had become clear that the Soviet space program needed a for-

  malized system to prepare and control the information that was revealed

  about the space effort, especially because the amount of information be-

  ing disseminated increased dramatically every year. The obvious solution

  was to assign Glavlit this job. In July 1967 the highest industrial officials

  in the space program drew up a plan to create an “expert commission”

  attached to Glavlit that would be responsible for coordinating and approv-

  ing all media on the Soviet space program. Because leading space pro-

  gram officials would head and manage the commission, Glavlit opposed

  this plan, undoubtedly because it would diminish Glavlit’s control over

  the flow of information. In the end, Glavlit lost this battle, and the job was

  assigned to the space establishment, with Glavlit maintaining a coordi-

  nating capacity instead of a leading one.36

  Mozzhorin retained the task of managing the public relations ca-

  pacity of the space program. As he moved from institution to institu-

  tion, from his original employer (NII-4) to TsNIIMash (the Tsentral’nyi

  nauchno-issledovatel’skii institut mashinostroeniia, or Central Scientific-

  Research Institute of Machine Building), the leading research and devel-

  opment institute of the Soviet space program, he took the media job with

  him. As director of TsNIIMash for nearly thirty years, Mozzhorin played

  a critical role in arbitrating conflicts within the Soviet space program but

  also formulating future plans. As such, he was in an ideal position to

  know the full spectrum of both prevailing and future capabilities of the

  program. His “propaganda” task was formalized by a Council of Min-

  isters decree on July 1, 1968, when the Soviet government for the first

  time officially assigned his staff at TsNIIMash the mission of “organization and preparation of materials on rocket-space themes for publication

  in print, transmission on radio and television and for showing in film and

  60  Asif A. Siddiqi

  in exhibitions.”37 Soon after, a team at TsNIIMash performed a two-year

  research project (from 1968 to 1970) on the entire spectrum of Soviet

  space-related propaganda and how to systematize the process. The team

  prepared a draft decree, later approved by the USSR Council of Ministers,

  which included a document titled “Regulations on the Preparation for

  Open Publication of Materials on Rocket-Space Technology.”38

  Secrecy was obviously a central concern here, as Mozzhorin himself

  recalled. He was responsible “not only for the preparation of drafts of

  TASS communiqués, [and] headers for scientific and technical articles

  in the newspapers, but also [for ensuring] . . . that all open publications

  on rocket-space technology in the Soviet Union and materials exported

  abroad were technically correct, did not contradict government edicts,

  and did not violate secrecy.”39 Mozzhorin performed this “thankless”

  job together with Anatolii Eremenko, “a very smart, principled, techni-

  cally literate, and lit
erary specialist” who headed TsNIIMash’s depart-

  ment of “information, expertise and history.” Like Mozzhorin, Eremenko

  authored many books and articles for the Soviet media on the history

  of Soviet space exploration.40 This department coordinated their work

  with representatives from the Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of De-

  fense, the defense industrial ministries, various ministries responsible

  for radio, television, print, film, central and local organs of the Soviet

  press, TASS, the Novosti press agency, and the Znanie (Knowledge) All-

  Union Society, a major popular science outlet during the Soviet era. Both

  Mozzhorin and Eremenko remained at their posts until 1990, when the

  former retired. Eremenko continues to work at TsNIIMash and remains

  in charge of its museum; in 2004, despite his work in the censorship ap-

  paratus or perhaps because of it, he was awarded the Utkin Silver Medal

  “for many years [of] active journalistic work on rocket and space technol-

  ogy and cosmonautics.”41

  Mozzhorin’s group played a key role in articulating the public face

  of the Soviet space program, but the evidence suggests that high-level

  party and government officials were frequently drawn into issues that

  were relatively trivial. The Military-Industrial Commission, the very pow-

  erful governmental body that supervised the Soviet military-industrial

  complex during much of the Cold War, for example, had to approve TASS

  communiqués on every Soviet space event prepared by Mozzhorin’s

  group. When questions of openness reached the Politburo level, as they

  did often, they highlighted an acute ambivalence about secrecy that fre-

  Cosmic Contradictions  61

  quently delayed plans. For instance, in February 1964, U.S. and Soviet

  officials signed an agreement to display space artifacts in each other’s

  countries. The Politburo (then known as the Presidium) met a couple of

  months later to discuss the issue but deferred to the expertise of rocket

  designers and administrators who recommended that certain aspects of

  the Vostok spacecraft be declassified for the exhibit.42

  Despite the recommendations, doubts plagued the main actors for

  months. The Central Committee and the Council of Ministers adopted a

  set of guidelines for displaying space program artifacts in museums only